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Jurisdictional
Theory
"Made
in
Japan":
Convergence of U.S. and
Continental European Approaches
Akihiro Hironaka*

ABSTRACT

Recent
Japanese cases
concerning
international
jurisdiction illustrate a convergence of two distinct legal
approaches to the treatment of jurisdictional issue-a rulebased, inflexible approach in Continental European countries
and a standard-based,flexible approach in the United States.
Japan's unique framework, as explained in this Article, might
provide a useful perspective to solve the difficult question
currently imposed on the Hague Conference: How is it possible
to achieve comprehensive harmonization of the jurisdictional
systems of the world?
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I. INTRODUCTION**

In designing legal systems that govern judicial decisions on
jurisdictional issues, two competing underlying policies must be
considered: one is predictability and ease of administration, and the

** This Article is based on a part of the author's unpublished LL.M. paper
submitted to Professor Joseph W. Singer and the author's unpublished seminar paper
submitted to Professor Arthur T. von Mehren, both in the spring 2003 term at Harvard
Law School. The author would like to thank both professors for their insightful
comments on the earlier drafts of these papers and on his presentation at the seminar.
The author also would like to thank his classmates from all over the world who
participated in Professor von Mehren's seminar for their comments on the
presentation, and Georg Stengel (Associate, von Boetticher Hasse Lohmann) for his
comments from a German law perspective. In addition, many thanks to Shane
McNamara (of Nishimura & Partners) and Paula Maute (in Cambridge) for editorial
assistance. The opinions presented in this Article are the personal views of the author
and not those of his clients, Nishimura & Partners, or its clients. The comments,
analysis, and opinions in this Article are based on the law as of May 1, 2004.
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other is fairness in litigation.1 It is generally accepted that the
former policy underlies the Continental European rule-based
approach, while the latter policy underlies the U.S. standard-based
approach. Jurisdictional issues under a rule-based approach are
decided based on provisions codified by a legislature. Under this
approach, as typified in Germany, judges are supposed to apply the
provisions faithfully to each case and are given little discretion in
deciding jurisdictional issues.
Jurisdictional issues under a
standard-based approach are decided in accordance with a certain
standard, such as "minimum contacts. ''2 Under this approach, typified
in the United States, judges are supposed to evaluate various
relevant factors presented in each case and decide whether each case
falls within the given standard. Under the standard-basedapproach,
judges are given broad discretion in evaluating the relevant factors.
This approach occasionally results in similar fact patterns being
decided in different ways by different judges.3 In the negotiations for
the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, it was evident that the fundamental
difference between these two major regimes is impeding efforts to
4
harmonize jurisdictional systems globally and comprehensively.
In Japan, the framers of the modern government created
provisions concerning jurisdiction in 1890 in the Code of Civil
Procedure, which was modeled after the German Code of Civil
Procedure. 5
Even under the current Japanese Code of Civil
Procedure6 (Minji Soshi-h6 or CCP), many jurisdictional provisions
have their counterparts in the current German Code of Civil

1.
Arthur T. von Mehren, Theory and Practice of Adjudicatory Authority in
Private International Law: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine, Policies and Practices
of Common- and Civil-Law Systems, 295 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 68 (2003) (discussing "ease of administration and
predictability" and "litigational fairness" as two sets of basic policies that control the
design of jurisdictional provisions applicable in multi-state litigation).
2.
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("[D]ue process
requires only that ... [the defendant] have certain minimum contacts with [the forum
state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."').
3.
See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 24, 57-59 (1992) (defining rules and standards).
4.
Linda J. Silberman, Can the Hague Judgments Project Be Saved?: A
Perspective from

the

United States,

in

A

GLOBAL LAW

OF JURISDICTION

AND

JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 167-68 (John J. Barcelo & Kevin M. Clermont
eds., 2002).
5.
Yasuhei Taniguchi, The 1996 Code of Civil Procedure of Japan-A
Procedurefor the Coming Century?, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 767, 767 (1997).
6.

MINJI SOSH6-H6

[CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Law No.

109 of 1996

(effective Jan. 1, 1998, hereinafter CCP); see CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN (Yasuhei
Taniguchi et al. eds., rev. 2d ed. 2000).
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Procedure. 7 With this background, one might expect Japanese courts
to take a Continental European approach in determining
jurisdictional issues. In 1981, the Japanese Supreme Court used a
rule-based, inflexible approach in applying the CCP provisions in its
leading decision, Malaysian Airline System Berhad v. Got5.8

The

Japanese lower courts, however, gradually shifted their position from
a formalistic rule-based approach to an ad hoc, standard-based
approach, as is used by U.S. courts. Finally, in 1997, the Japanese
Supreme Court endorsed this ad hoc approach in K.K. Family v.
Miyahara.9 But even under the current ad hoc approach, Japanese
courts are generally supposed to consider the jurisdictional rules
codified in the CCP. Thus, the current status of the Japanese
jurisdictional system presents a unique convergence of two distinct
legal regimes: that of Continental Europe and that of the United
States. This Article describes Japan's unique jurisdictional system in
order to provide a new perspective in this area.
II.

JAPANESE VENUE PROVISIONS IN THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

A. Introductory Remarks
The basic structure of the CCP's provisions concerning venue10
(the geographical allocation of judicial business among courts) has not

See ELIOTT J. HAHN, JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 81
7.
(1984) (stating that Japan's rules of jurisdiction are virtually identical to those of
Germany).
8.
35 MINSHO 1224 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 16, 1981); see infra Part III.B.

9.
51 MINSHO 4055 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 11, 1997); see infra Part III.D.
I use the term "venue provisions" in this Article to mean provisions
10.
concerning the allocation of judicial business codified in the CCP. "Venue" refers to
venues to which domestic cases are allocated within Japan. Japanese courts had
interpreted that the framers designed these provisions for domestic cases only, and
they applied these venue provisions to international cases mutatis mutandis, as is
explained below. But the Japanese Supreme Court implicitly denied this premise in a
recent decision in K.K. Family v. Miyahara, 51 MINSHO 4055, 4058 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 11,
1997) and implied that these provisions were designed to be applied to international
cases as well. See Hiroshi Takahashi, Annotated Case No. 54, in HEISEI 11 NENDO
SAIK6 SAIBANSHO HANREI KAISETSU [ANNOTATION ON SUPREME COURT DECISIONS OF
THE 199 TERM] 1320, 1334-35 (2002); see also Yasuhiro Fujita, Iwayuru "KokusaiMinji
Sosho-ho" naru Gainen no Yzgai-mueki-sei ni tsuite [On the Harmfulness and
Meaninglessness of the Concept "Law of InternationalCivil Procedure'], 283 HANREI
TAIMUZU 30 (1973); Yasuhiro Fujita, 'Kokusai Saiban Kankatsu Hdki" to Sono
Hikakuh5 teki Kenkya [Provisions of "InternationalJudicial Jurisdiction"and Their
Study from a Perspective of Comparative Law], 856 HANREI TAiMUzU 10 (1994). But I
maintain the wording "venue provisions" in this Article to distinguish clearly rules
codified in the CCP from ad hoc jurisdictional standards introduced by judicial
decisions after Malaysian Airline Sys. Berhad v. GotS, 35 MINSHO 1224 (Sup. Ct., Oct.
16, 1981), which I discuss in infra Part III.C.1. On the other hand, I use the word
'jurisdiction"to express competence of courts in internationalcases.
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changed since the enactment of the original code of civil procedure 1
in 1890, although some important additions and amendments were
made in 1926.12 Even with the overhaul of the civil procedure system
by the enactment of the current CCP in 1996, the substance of most
venue provisions remained untouched. 13 This means that the basic
venue provisions have remained the same for more than 110 years.
Since the 1981 Malaysian Airline case, 14 these CCP venue provisions
have been applied or applied mutatis mutandis in international
jurisdictional matters. 15
The venue provisions in the original code of civil procedure
enacted in 1890 were modeled after the German Code of Civil
Procedure, in which the venue provisions are classified into two
categories: (1) general venue (futsz-saibanseki or allgemeiner
Gerichtsstand) and (2) special venue (tokubetsu-saibanseki or
besonderer Gerichtsstand). This basic framework is still maintained
16
in the current CCP.
B. General Venue
First, the CCP provides that a lawsuit may be filed at a place
where "general venue" of the defendant exists.' 7 "General venue"
means a geographical region or area in which a court has authority to
adjudicate the case irrespective of the type or substance of the case.18
In each case where the defendant is a natural person, the general
venue of the defendant is in which the defendant has a "residence"
(jasho).19 In each case in which the defendant is a domestic
corporation established for commercial purposes, the general venue of
the defendant is its "principal place of business. '20 In each case in
which the defendant is a foreign corporation, the general venue of the
defendant is its "principal place of business in Japan.'21 These
provisions are based on the actor sequitur forum rei principle, which
originated in Roman law and is widely accepted in many countries.

11.

MINJI

SOSHO-HO

[CODE

OF CIVIL PROCEDURE],

Law

No.

29 of 1890

(effective Jan. 1, 1891).
12.
Law No. 29 of 1926.
13.
Compare CCP arts. 4, 5 and 7 with arts. 1-21 of the original CCP.
14.
Malaysian Airline Sys. Berhad v. Got6, 35 MINSHO 1224 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 16,
1981).
15.
Of course, these provisions are applied directly in domestic cases.
16.
See CCP arts. 4, 5 and 7.
17.
CCP art. 4(1).
18.
HAJIME KANEKO, SHINSHU MINJI SOSHO-HO TAIKEI [SYSTEM OF CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE] 80 (enl. ed. 1965).

19.
20.
H6 [Code
21.

CCP art. 4(2).
CCP art. 4(4); see 1 TSUNAHIRO KIKUI & TOSHIO MURAMATSU, MINJI SOSHOof Civil Procedure] 65 (completely rev. & supplemented ed. 1993).
CCP art. 4(5).
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The last provision concerning foreign corporations explained
22
It
above has no counterpart in the German Code of Civil Procedure.
23
important
This
CCP.
to
the
was added in the 1926 revisions
provision recognizes broad grounds for jurisdiction over foreign
corporations. For example, a Japanese corporation, Alpha Auto in
Tokyo, transacted with the New York head office of a U.S.
corporation, Beta Bank, and the Tokyo office of Beta Bank was not
involved in the transaction. A dispute later arose between Alpha
Auto and Beta Bank, and Alpha Auto wanted to file a lawsuit against
Beta Bank. Because the CCP provides that there is a general
jurisdiction for a foreign corporation at its principal place of business
in Japan, Alpha Auto may file a lawsuit in Japan even if Beta Bank's
Tokyo office was not involved in the transaction and dispute. The
reasonableness of such treatment may be arguable, 24 but this would
be the outcome of any case in which the provision is formalistically
applied. In fact, this is the outcome that the legislator intended when
it added the provision in 1926.25
C. Special Venue
1. Concept
Second, a lawsuit may be filed at any place where "special venue"
"Special venue" exists when the court has authority to
exists.
adjudicate according to the type or substance of the case as stated in

A separate provision, art. 5(v), provides that "a suit against a person
22.
maintaining an office or place of business and that concerns the affairs of such office or
place of business . . . may be filed before the court governing . . . the place where the

office or place of business is located." CCP art. 5(v). Contrary to art. 4(5) explained in
the text above, this provision requires a relationship between the dispute and the
business of the local office. Id.; see also ZivilprozeBordnung [ZPO] art. 21(1) (F.R.G.),
Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 5(5), 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, 4; Brussels Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art.
5(5). This CCP art. 5(v) is a special venue provision, which I explain later in this
Article, and is not a general venue provision.
Fujita, "Kokusai Saiban Kankatsu H~ki" to Sono Hikakuhd teki Kenkyl,
23.
supra note 10, at 15.
24.
At the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, participating countries seriously debated whether cases in
which the defendant performed some business activities in the forum state but where
the dispute was not related to those activities should be subject to the jurisdiction of
the place of such activities. But the debate was not reconciled. See Summary of the
Outcome of the Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic
Conference 6 - 20 June 2001, Hague Conference on Private International Law, art.
18(2)(e), availableat http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html.
See Fujita, "Kokusai Saiban Kankatsu Hdki" to Sono Hikakuhd teki
25.
Kenkya, supra note 10, at 16 (explaining that an old case, in which a Russian bank
having a branch in Japan was sued in Japan for a transaction in China, motivated the
legislator to add the general venue provision for foreign corporations).
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the CCP.26 Special venue is admitted in addition to general venue.
The venue provision that provides that a tort action may be filed at
27
the place of the tort is an example of a provision for special venue.
The provisions that specify "the place of property" 28 and "the place of
business ' 29 as places of venue are also examples of special venue in
the CCP.
This distinction between "general venue" and "special venue"
under Japanese law is not the same as the distinction between
"general jurisdiction" and "specific jurisdiction" under U.S. case law.3 0
The grounds for "special venue" under Japanese law, like those of
German law, are specified in accordance with the type of litigation.
The determination of venue may be made ex ante, without regard to
the particular case before the court.3 1 On the other hand, "specific
jurisdiction" under U.S. law is determined ex post and on a case-bycase basis in light of the circumstances of each specific case before the
court.

32

2. Example of a Problematic Provision: Place of Performance of
Obligation
Some venue provisions, if applied formalistically to international
cases, might lead to unreasonable results, especially for particular
defendants in certain circumstances. The following problem, caused
by disharmony between procedural law and substantive law brought
about in the process of implantation of European legal systems in
Japan, relates to one particular provision.
Article 5(i) of the CCP provides that "a suit concerning a
property right" may be filed before the court that governs "the place
of performance of the obligation. '33 This provision is one of the
special venue provisions, and it is modeled after the German Code of
Civil Procedure, which currently provides that "[t]he court of the
place at which the obligation in dispute is to be performed shall have
jurisdiction over disputes arising out of contractual relations or the

26.
KANEKO, supra note 18, at 81.
27.
CCP art. 5(ix).
28.
CCP art. 5(iv). This provision is modeled after ZPO art. 23.
29.
CCP art. 5(v). As explained, if this place is the principal place of business
in Japan, then the plaintiff may maintain its suit at such place as general venue
described in art. 4(5).
30.
See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984);
see also Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966) (offering descriptions of general and
specific jurisdiction in U.S. courts).
31.
Von Mehren, supra note 1, at 64.
32.
See id. at 65.
33.
CCP art. 5(i).
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existence thereof. '34 In Germany, if the "place at which the obligation
in dispute is to be performed" is not designated in the contract, then
the place of the obligor is deemed to be such place. 35 Therefore, in
this situation, the plaintiff in a coercive action must file a lawsuit
where the defendant resides if the "place at which the obligation in
dispute is to be performed" is not designated in the contract.3 6 Such a
conclusion is consistent with the actor sequitur forum rei principle.
In contrast, if a contract fails to designate the place of the
performance of the obligation, Japanese substantive law dictates that
the place of the obligee is the place of performance.3 7 This means that
the plaintiff in a coercive action may file a lawsuit where the plaintiff
resides if the parties failed to designate the place of the performance
of the obligation in the contract. In addition, according to several
lower court decisions in domestic cases, even if the parties agreed on
the place of performance of the obligation, when one party fails to
perform the obligation and the other party seeks pecuniary damages,
the place of the obligee, rather than the place of performance
designated in the contract for the original obligation, has been
deemed to be the place of payment of such pecuniary damages. 38
Therefore, in this view, the court's venue is the place of the obligee in
this situation as well.
This conclusion substantially undermines the actor sequitur
forum rei principle. This conclusion has generally been accepted with
reluctance as a defect of the CCP in the context of domestic
litigation.3 9 But the burden placed on the defendant by this flaw in
the CCP is much greater in international litigation than in domestic
litigation. Therefore, as discussed later, several courts have hesitated
40
to apply this provision to international litigation.
Furthermore, it becomes an issue whether this provision
concerning the place of performance of the obligation should be
applied not only to contract cases but also to tort cases. The problem
arose because the 1926 revision expanded the CCP provision's scope

34.

ZPO art. 29(1); see CHARLES E. STEWART, GERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE &

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ENGLISH 196 (2001).

35.
36.
37.

Buirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] art. 269 (F.R.G.).
BGB art. 269.
MINP6 [CIVIL CODE], Law No. 89 of 1896, art. 484; SHOHO [COMMERCIAL

CODE], Law No. 48 of 1899, art. 516.

38.
In the case of domestic litigation, see X v. Y, 15 MINSHO 2149 (Daishin'in,
Nov. 8, 1936); K.K. Nakamura Y6kei Fukaj6 v. Chin, 909 HANREI TAIMUZU 269, 271
(Tokyo Dist. Ct., Aug. 30, 1995). Other courts took the position that the place of
performance of obligation to pay such pecuniary damages is also governed by the
parties' agreement concerning the original obligation. See Kurimoto v. Shinoda, 20
TAIHAN MINROKU 21, 922 SHINBUN 26 (Daishin'in, Jan. 20, 1914); see also X v. Y, 2465
SHINBUN 12, 14 HYORON MINSO 429 (Daishin'in, Apr. 25, 1925).
39.
See KANEKO, supra note 18, at 83 (questioning legitimacy of this provision).
40.
See infra Part III.C.1.

JAPANESE JURISDICTIONAL THEORY

20041

1325

41
from contracts cases to all cases involving "rights of property,"
2
including torts. 4 Without hesitation, Japanese courts have applied
this provision to domestic tort cases. 43 But because of the flaw in this
provision explained above, most courts 44 denied the applicability of
this provision to international tort cases because there is a special
provision for tort cases in the CCP. 45
Scholars have asserted that several CCP venue provisions, like
this provision, are problematic when applied formalistically in
international cases. 46 As will be explained below, these criticisms
have influenced many courts to depart from mechanical application of
CCP venue provisions after MalaysianAirline.

III. JAPANESE CASE LAW REGARDING INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION
A. Before MalaysianAirline
Before the Japanese Supreme Court decision in Malaysian
Airline System Berhad v. Got6, 47 lower courts were split in how they
determined international jurisdictional issues. The courts had not
agreed on whether they should be strictly bound by CCP provisions in
deciding jurisdictional issues in international cases.
One tendency of courts before Malaysian Airline, even though it
was not necessarily prevailing, was to balance various interests or
considerations and not be bound strictly by the CCP venue
In this sense, the inclination toward litigational
provisions. 4 8
application of venue
than the formalistic
fairness-rather
provisions-existed in Japanese case law before Malaysian Airline.
For example, in Yabutani v. Boeing Co., 49 explained below, when the

41.

1 KIKUI & MURAMATSU, supra note 20, at 67.

Id. at 70.
42.
See id.
43.
Enterprise Konma K.K. v. K.K. Saniclean Honbu, 1561 HANREI JIHO 84, 91
44.
(Tokyo Dist. Ct., Apr. 25, 1995); Kojima v. Chin, 790 KIN'YU SHOJI 32 (Tokyo Dist. Ct.,
June 1, 1987); Greenlines Shipping Co. v. California First Bank, 525 HANREI TAIMUZU
132, 137 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Feb. 15, 1984).
CCP art. 5(ix); see supra Part II.C.1.
45.
CCP art. 4(5) (the principal place of business in Japan, explained above),
46.
art. 5(iv) (the place of defendant's property, a provision similar to ZPO art. 23), and art.
7 (joinder of claims or parties) are examples of such problematic provisions. For
further explanation of CCP art. 7, see infra note 119.
35 MINSHO 1224 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 16, 1981).
47.
48.

See KAZUNORI ISHIGURO,

GENDAI KOKUSAI

SHIHO-J0

[CONTEMPORARY

CONFLICT OF LAWS I] 319-20 (1986) (commenting that Yabutani, infra, is a case in
which the court tried to balance interests and that the court's decision in Yabutani is in
contrast with the formalistic approach seen in MalaysianAirline).
49.

754

HANREI

JIHO

58,

312

HANREI

TAIMUZU

241

(Tokyo

Dist.

Ct.

Interlocutory J., July 24, 1974), an excerpt translated in 19 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 225
(1975).
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court interpreted the phrase "the place of the tort," the court aimed to
balance the various interests of the parties and the convenience of
50
adjudication.
In this case, the plaintiffs claimed in a lawsuit against Boeing
that they suffered damage as a result of an airplane crash that
occurred in Tokyo Bay on February 4, 1966, allegedly because of a
defect in the airplane. In this case, the Tokyo District Court, after
balancing the various factors involved in the case, found the
jurisdiction of Japanese courts as the place of the accident.
[W]e believe that Japan should be . . . considered ["the place of the
tort"]. Of course, . . . the "place of accident" may not properly be
considered a "place of the tort" if... the "place of the accident" is too
isolated to be foreseen by the tortfeasor and the disadvantage suffered
by the tortfeasor of having to defend the lawsuit brought at that place
is markedly greater than the benefits . ...
In the present case,
however, the fact that the defendant ...
is a corporationpossessing a
large amount of capital and engaged in the manufacture, etc., of aircraft
capable of flying freely all over the world, with moreover many aircraft
manufactured by it publicly known to be in use in Japan, together with
the fact that the nature of aircraft is such that an accident affecting
human life or limb would be inevitable if the aircraft manufactured by
the defendant were defective, leads us to the conclusion that Japan, the
place where the effects of the accident occurred, is clearly far from an
isolated place not at all foreseen by the defendant. (Emphasis added to
compare with Okuma, infra.)5 1

The decision in Yabutani implied that the court would not apply
the CCP's provision of "the place of the tort" if the accident had
occurred at a place that "is too isolated to be foreseen by" the foreign
defendant. The court denied an approach applying venue provisions
formalistically to international cases. Formalistic application of
venue provisions would not have allowed the court to make its
conclusion depending on specific circumstances particular to the case,
such as the nature of the defendant or the defendant's foreseeability
of certain occurrences.
B. MalaysianAirline System Berhad v. Got6
In Malaysian Airline,52 the Supreme Court of Japan handed
down a decision regarding international jurisdiction in a monetary

50.
Another example of a case in which a court balanced various interests in its
jurisdictional determination is Yamazaki v. K.K. Takenaka Kbmuten, 925 HANREI JIHO
78 (Tokyo Dist. Ct. Interlocutory J., Mar. 20, 1979).
51.
Yabutani, 754 HANREI JIHO at 62-63, 312 HANREI TAIMUZU at 246. This
translation is based on a translation in JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L., supra note 49, at 22829, with some modification.
52.
Malaysian Airline Sys. Berhad v. Got5, 35 MINSHu 1224 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 16,
1981), an excerpt translated in 26 JAPANESE ANN. INTL L. 122 (1983).
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damages case for the first time since the Second World War. This
decision set a precedent concerning international jurisdiction.
The Malaysian Airline case was filed in connection with an
53
airplane crash in Johor Bahru, Malaysia, on December 4, 1977. The
plaintiff, Tomio Got5, boarded a plane operated by Malaysian Airline
from Penang to Kuala Lumpur, both cities in Malaysia. 54 The head
55
Malaysian
office of Malaysian Airline was in Kuala Lumpur.
ticket in
his
bought
Got5
Mr.
but
Tokyo,
Airline had an office in
56
the air
in
involved
not
was
office
Therefore, the Tokyo
Malaysia.
Airline.
Malaysian
and
Got5
Mr.
between
transportation contract
58
His wife
The plane crashed 57 and Mr. Got6 died in the accident.
Japan
in
Court
District
and children filed a suit in the Nagoya
caused
allegedly
damage
for
Y40
million
seeking payments of around
by a breach of the air transportation contract and inherited by the
The defendant challenged the
plaintiffs form Mr. GotS. 59
international jurisdiction of a Japanese court. 60 In this case, the
flight had been booked in Malaysia, and transportation was made
within that country; therefore, no issue was raised concerning the
provisions in the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain
61
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air. The Nagoya
62
District Court did not find jurisdiction in this case, but the Nagoya
High Court (the intermediate appellate court) 63 and the Supreme
64
Court did.
The Supreme Court first held that the venue provisions in the
CCP do not apply to international cases 65 and that jurisdictional rules
must be controlled by "general principles of justice" (jri) based on
66
But the
equity between the parties and a fair and speedy trial.
CCP is
in
the
provided
for
venue
ground
if
any
that
court further held

53.

35 MINSHO at 1226.

Id.
54..
Id. at 1227.
55.
Id. at 1226.
56.
The airplane was hijacked and the chief pilot was shot and killed. The
57.
airplane crashed as a consequence.
58.

MalaysianAirline Sys. Berhad, 35 MINSHU at 1226.

Id.
59.
Got5 v. Malaysian Airline Sys. Berhad, 35 MINSHU 1236, 1239-41 (Nagoya
60.
Dist. Ct., Mar. 15, 1979).
See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST
61.
FOR REASONABLENESS: ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 n.7 (1996).
Gotd, 35 MINSHU at 1239.
62.

Got5 v. Malaysian Airline Sys. Berhad, 35 MINSHU 1241, 1242 (Nagoya
63.
High Ct., Nov. 12, 1979).
64.

MalaysianAirline Sys. Berhad, 35 MINSHO at 1227.

The Supreme Court implicitly denied in a recent case the premise that the
65.
CCP venue provisions were intended to be applied in domestic cases only. See supra
note 10.
Malaysian Airline Sys. Berhad v. GotS, 35 MINSHO 1224, 1226 (Sup. Ct.,
66.
Oct. 16, 1981).
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found for the Japanese court, then, according to "general principles of
justice," the defendant is subject to the international jurisdiction of
Japan. '6 7 In that sense, the venue provisions in the CCP are applied
mutatis mutandis to international cases. In this case, the defendant
had appointed its representative in Japan and had a "principal place
of business in Japan"-i.e., the Tokyo office. 6 8 Therefore, there was a
ground for venue under art. 4(3) (of the original CCP, which
corresponds to art. 4(5) of the current CCP), which provides general
venue for a foreign corporation that has a place of business in Japan.
The Supreme Court approved the Nagoya High Court's decision
69
finding jurisdiction over the case.
A majority of scholars criticized the reasoning of the decision
from two perspectives. These criticisms led to changes in Japanese
practices in international jurisdictional matters.
The first criticism focused on a concern that the reasoning
behind this decision could lead the courts to assume excessively broad
jurisdiction over foreign defendants. 70 They claimed that the mere
fact that Malaysian Airline had an office in Japan did not justify the
Court's decision that it had jurisdiction over the airline company
when the dispute had no relationship with the business of that
office. 7 1 The scholars criticized the way in which the Supreme Court
formalistically applied the CCP's venue provision to international
cases. 72 They asserted that the venue provisions in the CCP should
not have been applied without appropriate modification, because the
provisions are intended to be applied in domestic cases only. 73 They
further asserted that the Supreme Court should have limited the
applicability of the "general venue" provision concerning the
"principal place of business in Japan" to cases in which the
74
defendant's office in Japan had some relationship to the dispute.

67.
Id. at 1226-27.
68.
Id. at 1227.
69.
Id.
70.
See, e.g., Yoshimitsu Aoyama, Kokusai Saiban Kankatsuken [International
Judicial Jurisdiction], 16 HOGAKU KY6SHITsU 83, 83 (1981) (on file with author)
(criticizing the reasoning of the decision, but supporting its conclusion); Sueo Ikehara,
Kokusaiteki Saibankankatsuken [InternationalJurisdiction], in 7 SHIN JITSUMU MINJI
SOSH0 KOZA [NEW LECTURES ON PRACTICE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] 3, 24-25 (ChOaichi

Suzuki & Akira Mikazuki eds., 1982); see also Masato Dbgauchi, Kokusai Saiban
Kankatsuken [International Judicial Jurisdiction], in 1 CHOSHAKU MINJI SOSHO-H0
[COMMENTARY ON CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] 86, 100-01 (K6ji Shindb & Takeshi

Kojima eds., 1991).
71.
See Aoyawa, supra note 70, at 83; Ikehara, supra note 70, at 24-25;
Dagauchi, supra note 70, at 100-01.
72.
Id.
73.
See supra notes 10, 60.
74.
Compare ZPO art. 21(1), and Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 5(5), 2001
O.J. (L 12) 1, 4, and Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 5(5). See also LOWENFELD, supra
note 61, at 50. This interpretation virtually makes CCP art. 4(5) (general venue at a
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The second criticism addressed the fact that the Supreme Court
did not explicitly admit the possibility of an exception to the
formalistic application of venue provisions in the CCP. 76 In general,
when Japanese courts establish certain legal rules or principles to be
invoked in following court decisions, they tend to mention explicitly
possible exceptions to such rules or principles as "safety valves" by
inserting language such as "other than in cases where exceptional
circumstances exist." But in Malaysian Airline, the Supreme Court
did not explicitly state such a possibility in the language of the
decision.
Scholars criticized this, claiming that such inflexible
treatment, relying only on the venue provisions of the CCP cannot
accommodate various situations in international cases and cannot
76
achieve fairness in all cases.
In sum, these critics expressed a concern over the courts'
inflexibility in being bound by the CCP's venue provisions when
determining international jurisdiction.
But the position of the
Supreme Court in Malaysian Airline may be supported for its
predictability and ease of administration of jurisdictional rules.
C. Developments of Lower Court Decisions after Malaysian Airline
1. Introductory Remarks
After Malaysian Airline, some Japanese lower courts followed
the position of the Supreme Court by using a formalistic application
of the CCP venue provisions. 77 But in response to the two criticisms
on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Malaysian Airline, many lower
courts rejected the formalistic attitude of that decision.
First, many lower courts rejected the formalistic application of
the CCP venue provisions. These courts considered factors relevant
to international litigation, such as the burden placed on foreign but
not domestic defendants. 78 For this reason, these courts generally

principal place of business in Japan) useless in international cases, because a separate
provision, CCP art. 5(v) (special venue at a place of business) allows a court at the
place of business to adjudicate any case in which that place has some relationship with
the dispute.
75.
E.g., D6gauchi, supra note 70, at 100-01; Masato D~gauchi, Saik6

Saibansho Minji Hanrei Kenkya [Notes on Civil Cases of the Supreme Court], 105
HOGAKU KYOKAi ZASSHI 974, 983, 985-86 (1988).
76.
D6gauchi, supra note 70, at 100-01; D5gauchi, supra note 75, at 983, 98586.
77.
E.g., X v. Takahashi, 476 HANREI TAIMUZU 118, 118 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Apr.
22, 1982) (ruling on the venues concerning the "place of performance of obligation" and
the "place of the tort"); K.K. Yamash5 v. Trans-Asiatic, Inc., 460 HANREi TAIZUMU 118,
119-20 (Tokyo Dist. Ct. Interlocutory J., Nov. 27, 1981) (ruling on the venue concerning
the "place of performance of obligation").
See, e.g., Greenlines Shipping Co. v. California First Bank, 525 HANREI
78.
TAIMUZU 132, 135 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Feb. 15, 1984).
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held that the venue rules of the CCP must be modified in favor of
foreign defendants when applied to international cases. For example,
a lower court rejected the idea that a foreign defendant's maintenance
of an office in Japan is ground for jurisdiction even if the activity at
that office has no relationship with the dispute. 79 Other courts,
however, formalistically applied the provision.8 0
Many courts
modified the CCP's other problematic venue provisions when
applying them to international cases.
The provision concerning "the place of performance of the
obligation," as explained above, 8' is one example of such a
problematic venue provision. At least one lower court applied this
provision formalistically to international cases.8 2 Another lower court
restricted the applicability of this provision when it became an issue
in an international case, despite the fact that there is no limitation in
the language itself. The court suggested that this provision is to be
applied only when the parties agreed on "the place of performance"
83
unambiguously in the contract itself.
Second, many lower courts acted in accordance with the second
criticism of Malaysian Airline explained above, asserting that even
when a ground for venue pursuant to the CCP exists in Japan,
international jurisdiction should be denied in certain circumstances.
Proponents of the second criticism asserted that the courts should
consider making exceptions to the outcome of the application of the
CCP venue provisions. A lower court that agreed with this criticism
held:
If any ground for venue provided in the CCP exists in Japan, unless
there are exceptional circumstances (tokudan no jijd) that will lead a
court to violate basic principles of civil trial [i.e., equity between parties

79.
Id. (denying jurisdiction because there was no relationship between the
activity of the office in Japan and the dispute).
80.
Tokyo Kaij5 Kasai Hoken K.K. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 1075 HANREI
JIH6 137, 140 (Tokyo Dist. Ct. Interlocutory J., Sept. 27, 1982) (affg jurisdiction
without finding a relationship between the business of the office and the dispute).
81.
See infra Part II.C.2.
82.
Takahashi, 476 HANREI TAIMUZU at 118.
83.
Barclays Bank Plc. v. K.K. Japan Planning Ass'n, 1509 HANREI JIHO 101,
104, 837 HANREI TAIMUzu 300, 303 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Jan. 31, 1994) (holding that in a
case where the indirect international jurisdiction is at issue in the proceedings of
enforcement of a foreign judgment, this provision cannot be applied when the "place of
performance of obligation" is determined by the choice-of-law rule of the forum state).
"Indirect" jurisdiction is jurisdiction that is required as a precondition for recognition
and enforcement of a foreign judgment under CCP art. 118(i) and MINJI SHIKKO-HO
[CODE OF CIVIL EXECUTION], Law No. 4 of 1979, art. 24(3), as opposed to "direct"
jurisdiction, which is required as a precondition for adjudication of such cases as are
primarily discussed in this Article.
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and speedy and fair trial], the principles of justice (jri) require the
84
court to exercise jurisdiction over the case. (Emphasis added.)

Several lower courts followed this position, which has gradually
become the mainstream approach. These decisions have employed an
"exceptional circumstances" approach to defeat the jurisdiction of
Japanese courts even when grounds for venue exist (i.e., denials of
jurisdiction because of "exceptional circumstances.")
Some
commentators have further asserted that, even when there is no
ground for venue in Japan under the CCP, when "exceptional
circumstances" exist, the court should find jurisdiction over the case
(i.e.,
acceptance
of jurisdiction
because- of
"exceptional
circumstances.")8 5 Several courts have held that certain problematic
venue provisions should be applied only when "exceptional
circumstances" exist,8 6 and this position can be considered a type of
such
acceptance
of jurisdiction
because
of
"exceptional
circumstances."
In sum, although in Malaysian Airline the Supreme Court
established the formula that "grounds for venue in the CCP =
grounds for international jurisdiction," lower courts subsequently
held that "grounds for venue in the CCP grounds for international
jurisdiction. 8 7
This inequality manifested itself in both the
modification or exemption of some CCP venue provisions and in the
denial (or acceptance) of international jurisdiction by allowing
exceptions on the basis of "exceptional circumstances."
2. Examples of the "Exceptional Circumstances" Approach
Scholars commonly refer to lower courts' use of "exceptional
circumstances" after Malaysian Airline as the "exceptional
circumstances" approach (tokudan no jij6 approach).88
As the
"exceptional circumstances" approach became dominant, courts
placed less and less importance on the interpretation of the venue

84.
Tokyo Kaijd Kasai Hoken K.K., 1075 HANREI JIHO at 140 (finding
jurisdiction over the case holding that there is no such "exceptional circumstance" in
the case).
85.
Masato Dbgauchi, Gaikoku K~kaki Seiz5 Kaisha ni taisuru Seizdbutsu
Sekinin Sosh5 no Kokusaiteki Saiban Kankatsuken [International Jurisdiction of
Product Liability Case against Foreign Manufacturer of Airplane], 310 HANREI
HYORON 41, 44 (1984);
HIDEYUKI KOBAYASHI, KOKUSAI TORIHIKI FUNSO
[INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTION DISPUTE] 131 (3d ed. 2003).
86.
Nagan (Panama) S.A. v. Attica Shipping Co. S.A., 1275 HANREI JIHO 77, 80,
669 HANREI TAIMUZU 219, 222 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., July 28, 1987), an excerpt translated in
32 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 161 (1989).
87.
See D5gauchi, supra note 70, at 101-02, 106. Professor Dbgauchi used this
formula to express only the first tendency (the CCP venue provision 0 grounds for
international jurisdiction) described in my explanation above.
88.
Dagauchi, supra note 70, at 105; KOBAYASHI, supra note 85, at 125.
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provisions in the CCP.
Some courts even began circumventing
interpretation of these provisions. In their decisions, such courts
shifted their reasoning from a focus on interpretation of CCP
provisions to balancing interests in determining the existence of
"exceptional circumstances." The following two cases exemplify this
tendency.
a. Okuma v. Boeing Co.
The court's decision in Okuma v. Boeing Co. 89 clearly
demonstrates a formalistic interpretation of one of the CCP
provisions regarding "the place of the tort" and the balancing of
interests in the determination of "exceptional circumstances."
Okuma was a case instituted by families of victims of a 1964
helicopter crash that killed eight people and seriously injured one
person in Fukuoka, Japan. 90 The helicopter was owned by the Air
Self-Defense Force of Japan. 91 Investigators speculated that the
accident was caused by a defect in a metal socket that supported the
rear blades of the helicopter. 92 The defendant in this lawsuit was
Boeing, but Boeing had not manufactured the helicopter or its
components. 93
Another company, Vetrol, manufactured the
particular metal helicopter socket. Boeing had acquired Vetrol based
on an agreement in 1960 under which Boeing assumed the assets and
debts of Vetrol. 94 Boeing's acquisition of Vetrol was completed before
the 1964 crash of the helicopter. 95
Vetrol manufactured the
helicopter at issue and sold it to the U.S. Air Force between 1955 and
1958.96 The U.S. Air Force then sold the helicopter to the Air Self97
Defense Force of Japan in 1960.
The Tokyo District Court determined relatively easily that Japan
was the "place of the tort. '98 The court held:
[T]here is a suspicion that a defect of the part of the helicopter
manufactured by Vetrol caused the damage to the plaintiffs suffered as
a result of the accident in Japan, and that the defendant assumed the
liability to pay damages that would have been borne by Vetrol. Thus, it
can be said that the damage of the plaintiffs occurred in Japan as a
result of a tort of Vetrol, which eventually became a tort of the
defendant. Therefore, the basis of jurisdiction prescribed in art. 15(1)

89.
1113 HANREI JIHO 26 (Tokyo Dist. Ct. Interlocutory J., Mar. 27, 1984), an
excerpt translated in 28 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 248 (1985).
90.
Id. at 27, 31.
91.
Id at 31.
92.
Id. at 31-32.
93.
Id.
94.

Okuma, 1113 HANREI JIH6 at 32.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at 32.
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[currently, art. 5(ix)] of the CCP exists in Japan, for Japan is deemed to
99
be the place of the tort.

The court further discussed whether there was an "exceptional
circumstance" that required the court to deny its jurisdiction.
[Tihe defendant is a corporation that has substantial capital and is
manufacturing aircrafts that fly all over the world and is performing
other business activities, and its wholly owned subsidiary company,
Boeing International Corp., has its office in Japan ....
[In addition,
t]he plaintiffs have their residences in Japan, where the tort was
committed; and the Investigation Committee of the Air Self-Defense
Force of Japan examined the cause of the crash in this case. In light of
these facts, it cannot be said that the trial of this case would bring so
much disadvantage for the defendant as to deprive it of the opportunity
to protect itself; and it would bring no inconvenience for the court as to
infringe upon the equity between parties and fair and speedy trial
concerning the examination of the evidence. (Emphasis added.) 1 0 0

Holding as above, the court denied that "exceptional
circumstances" existed and ruled that it had jurisdiction in this
case.1 0 1 By comparing the italicized portions in the interpretation of
"the place of the tort" in Yabutani to the determination of
"exceptional circumstances" in Okuma, it becomes clear that the
weight of reasoning shifted from the interpretation of the CCP venue
provision to the determination of "exceptional circumstances."
b. Muk6da v. Boeing Co.
Muk~da v. Boeing Co., 10 2 a Taiwanese air crash case, further
exemplifies Japanese courts' rationale and problems with the
"exceptional circumstances" approach.
In this case, Boeing
manufactured the aircraft and United Airlines Inc. (UA) purchased
it. 103 In 1976, after UA had used the aircraft for seven years, it sold
the aircraft to Far Eastern Air Transport (FEAT), a Taiwanese
airline company.' 04 The aircraft crashed in Taiwan, about three
minutes after departure from the airport in Taipei.10 5 In this
accident, eighteen
Japanese,
eighty-seven Taiwanese,
four
10 6
Canadians, and one American died.

99.
Id.
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102.
1196 HANREI JIHO 87, 604 HANREI TAIMUZU 138 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., June 20,
1986), an excerpt translated in 31 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 216 (1988).
103.
1196 HANREI JIHO at 92, 604 HANREI TAIMUZU at 142.
104.
Id.
105.
Id.
106.
Hiroshi Matsuoka, Taiwan ni okeru K6kiiki jiko ni kanrenshite Beikoku
HOjin ni taishite Teiki sareta Fuhd K~i ni motozuku Songai Baish6 Seikyd Soshd no
Kokusai Saiban Kankatsu [International Judicial Jurisdiction Over a Case Filed
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After the accident, the Taiwanese authority, the China Civil
Aeronautics Authority, organized a subcommittee to investigate the
cause of the crash.10 7 The members of the subcommittee included
Taiwanese committee members as well as two U.S. investigators from
the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board.10 8 The Taiwanese
subcommittee submitted a report on the result of the research, but it
did not decisively state that the cause of the crash was a defect in the
airplane. 0 9 The report suggested that the possibility of insufficient
maintenance by FEAT caused the crash. 110 The aircraft's wreckage
was submitted to a U.S. authority for investigation, and it was
returned to the Taiwanese authority thereafter. 1 '
Before a lawsuit was filed in Japan, the plaintiffs filed lawsuits
against Boeing, UA, and FEAT 112 in a U.S. district court. 113 But the
U.S. court dismissed their actions based on the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, holding that a Taiwanese court was an appropriate
forum.

114

The families of the Japanese victims filed this lawsuit against
Boeing and UA in Japan. 115 The plaintiffs claimed that the crash was
caused by Boeing's defects in design and manufacture of the aircraft
and its failure to repair and reinforce its defective parts. 116 Further,
they claimed that UA should not have knowingly sold the defective
117
aircraft to FEAT.
The Tokyo District Court found a venue ground in the CCP
based on the fact that UA had a Tokyo office. The court followed the
formalistic application of the venue provisions concerning the
"principal place of business in Japan" as in Malaysian Airline.118 But
the court circumvented decisions as to the applicability of art. 5 of the
original CCP (which corresponds to art. 5(i) of the current CCP,

Against U.S. CorporationsSeeking Damages Caused by Torts Concerning an Air Crash
Accident in Taiwan], 343 HANREI HYORON 33, 33 (1987).
107.
1196 HANREI JIHO at 92, 604 HANREI TAIMUZU at 142.
108.
Muk5da v. Boeing Co., 1196 HANREI JIHO 87, 93, 604 HANREI TAIMUZU 138,
143 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., June 20, 1986).
109.
110.

1196 HANREI JIHO at 92-93, 604 HANREI TAIMUZU at 142-43.
1196 HANREI JIHO at 93, 604 HANREI TAIMUZU at 143.

111.
Id.
112.
Plaintiffs reached a settlement with FEAT in the amount of around V9
million per victim, which is nearly the upper limit under Taiwanese law, and the
plaintiffs dismissed the complaint. Therefore, FEAT was not a defendant in the
subsequent case at a Japanese court. KOBAYASHI, supra note 85, at 6. Professor
Kobayashi was one of the attorneys for UA in Muk~da in a Japanese court.
Nai-Chao v. Boeing Co., 555 F. Supp. 9, 10-11 (N.D. Cal. 1982), affd, Cheng
113.
v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1983).
114.
Id. at 11.
115.

Mukbda v. Boeing Co., 1196 HANREI JIHO 87, 87-88, 604 HANREI TAIMUZU

138, 138-39 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., June 20, 1986).
116.
117.
118.

1196 HANREI JIHO at 89, 604 HANREI TAIMUZU at 139.
Id.
1196 HANREI JIHO at 92, 604 HANREI TAIMUZU at 142.
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providing the venue as the place of the performance of the obligation)
and art. 21 of the original CCP (which corresponds to art. 7 of the
current CCP, providing the venue for the joinder of parties). 119 The
court denied jurisdiction without clarifying its position on the
applicability of art. 5 and art. 21 of the CCP to international cases,
holding that "exceptional circumstances" to deny jurisdiction existed
1 20
in this case.
First, the court emphasized that important pieces of evidence
and witnesses were located in Taiwan, and that the Japanese court
had no means to obtain this evidence through judicial assistance
because the Japanese and Taiwanese governments had no official
diplomatic relationship with each another. 1 2 1 Second, although the
plaintiffs asserted that they had exhausted their litigation funds
through the lawsuits in the United States and that no funds
remained to pursue another lawsuit in Taiwan, the court held that
the plaintiffs had not submitted any evidence proving their assertion
concerning their financial status. 122 Third, the court held that, even
if the amount of damages in Taiwan would be lower than those in
Japan, such a fact should not be considered in the determination of
jurisdiction. 1 2 3 This third point of the decision can be interpreted as
indicating that the court specifically noted the relationship between
1 24
the applicable law and the choice of forum.
The rationale in this decision was quite unconvincing. First, the
court emphasized the unavailability of the evidence in Taiwan

119.
Id. Art. 21 of the original CCP provided that if any one of the CCP venue
grounds exists as to either of the claims in cases of joinder of claims or parties, the
court has jurisdiction with respect to all of the claims. Under art. 7 of the current CCP,
however, in cases of joinder of parties, the court has jurisdiction for all claims only
when the claims by or against the parties are closely related. The treatment concerning
joinder of claims was left unchanged with the enactment of the current CCP. Under
either version of the provision concerning joinder of parties, a defendant of a case may
be subject to jurisdiction of a court of Japan for the reason that his or her co-defendant
is subject to jurisdiction of a court of Japan. For example, in a case in which A and B
are co-defendants, B may be subject to jurisdiction of a court of Japan because A is
subject to jurisdiction of a court of Japan. Many legal scholars have argued that this
ground for venue for joinder of partiesis too broad and exorbitant to admit as a ground
for jurisdiction in international cases. See Yoshiaki Sakurada, Shukanteki Heig5 ni
yoru Kankatsu-ken [Jurisdictiondue to Joinder of Parties], in SHIN - SAIBAN JITSUMU
TAIKEI III [NEw - SYSTEM OF PRACTICE OF LITIGATION III] 127, 128-29 (Akira
Takakuwa & Masato D6gauchi eds., 2002).
120.
Muk~da v. Boeing Co., 1196 HANREI JIHO 87, 92-94, 604 HANREI TAIMUZU
138, 142-44 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., June 20, 1986).
121.
1196 HANREI JIHO at 93, 604 HANREI TAIMUZU at 143.
122.
1196 HANREI JIHO at 94, 604 HANREI TAIMUZU at 144.
123.
Id.
124.
Compare with the treatment, in the U.S., of forum non conveniens on this
point in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254-55 (1981) (deciding that the
unfavorable change in law may be given substantial weight in a decision of forum non
conveniens when the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate
or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all).
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because of the lack of an official diplomatic channel between Japan
and Taiwan. 125 But commentators pointed out that the difficulty of
obtaining evidence in Taiwan could have been resolved through
unofficial channels between the two countries. 126 Furthermore, in
this case several U.S. government officials participated in the
subcommittee that investigated the cause of the accident, and the
U.S. authority itself inspected the aircraft wreckage.' 2 7 Even if a
Taiwan court was more convenient than the Japanese court,
inconvenience in the Japanese court was not a strong enough factor
to exclude Japanese plaintiffs from obtaining relief at the place most
convenient to them, because Japanese courts could have obtained
necessary evidence from the U.S. authority that had been involved in
the investigation.
Second, compared with the burden faced by the defendants, the
plaintiffs' need to obtain a remedy in Japan was much more severe.
In this case, the U.S. defendants did not challenge the jurisdiction of
the Taiwanese courts. The U.S. defendants' burden would not have
been much different if they had been required to appear in a
Japanese court rather than a Taiwanese court. On the other hand,
pursuing litigation in a Taiwanese court would have been much more
burdensome than appearing in a Japanese court for the Japanese
victims' families.
Third, although the decision concerning the relationship between
the applicable law and the choice of forum in this decision is
consistent with the prevalent Japanese theory, in determining
whether "exceptional circumstances" existed, the court should have
allowed some possibility for special consideration of the likelihood
that substantially less damages would be awarded in Taiwan than in
Japan. In this case, the plaintiffs resided in Japan and defendants
were U.S. corporations; no Taiwanese was involved. If the standards
of damages between the United States and Japan were at issue, then
the reasoning in the decision might have been more plausible. But
because none of the parties had a continuous relationship with
Taiwan, invoking Taiwanese standards of damages in this case was
somewhat fortuitous for the U.S. defendants. In the determination of
"exceptional circumstances" in this case, the court should have
considered that adjudication in a Taiwan court would have
125.
Muk~da, 1196 HANREI JIHO at 93, 604 HANREI TAIMUZU at 143-44.
126.
Hiroshi Yamamoto, Taiwan ni okeru Taiwan Kokunai Kokzgaisha
Ryokakuki Tsuiraku Jiko no Nihonjin Izoku ni yoru Ryokakuki Seiz5, Hanbaigaishani
taisuru Songaibaisho Seikya Sosh5 no Kokusai Saiban Kankatsu [International
Judicial Jurisdiction Over a Case Where Families of Japanese Victims of Taiwanese
Airplane Crash Accident in Taiwan Claimed Damages Against the Manufacturer and
Seller of the Airplane], 74 HOGAKU KYOSHITSU 132, 133 (1986); Matsuoka, supra note
106, at 39.
Muk6da v. Boeing Co., 1196 HANREI JIHO 87, 93, 604 HANREI TAIMUZU 138,
127.
143 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., June 20, 1986).
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considerably lowered the amount of damages for the Japanese

plaintiffs. 128
Fourth, and most important, this decision appears to have been
affected by the fact that the U.S. court had already dismissed the case
based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Of course, neither the
U.S. court nor the Japanese court was located at the place of the
accident. But the interests these courts had in this case were clearly
different. The U.S. court had no interest in adjudicating this case
because the U.S. defendants did not request it, most of the plaintiffs
in this case were not U.S. citizens, 129 and the accident took place far
from the United States. On the other hand, the Japanese court
should not have ignored its strong interest in providing plaintiffs who
resided in Japan with an opportunity to obtain remedy efficiently. It
might be said that this indifference as to convenience of Japanese
plaintiffs is a characteristic tendency of Japanese courts. The Family
case, discussed below, is an example of this tendency.
D. Family K.K. v. Miyahara
The so-called "exceptional circumstances" approach that
developed after Malaysian Airline gradually became the mainstream
of Japanese lower court decisions, and it was finally endorsed by the
1997 Supreme Court decision in Family K.K. v. Miyahara.130
The plaintiff in this case was a Japanese corporation that
imported automobiles. 13 1 The defendant was a Japanese individual
who had resided in Germany for more than twenty years, engaging in
commercial transactions with Japanese corporations. 132 The plaintiff
entered into an agreement with the defendant providing that the
defendant would purchase automobiles on behalf of the plaintiff while
the plaintiff would pay fees to the defendant for this arrangement. 133
The defendant requested that the plaintiff provide the defendant with
cash for use in purchasing automobiles. 134 The plaintiff provided the
defendant with Y91,747,138 in accordance with this request. 135 The
plaintiff began to mistrust the management of the funds by the

128.
Some of the plaintiffs subsequently filed an appeal to the Tokyo High
Court, and they reached a settlement in which Boeing would pay the plaintiffs V2
million. KOBAYASHI, supra note 85, at 7.
129.
Nai-Chao v. Boeing Co., 555 F. Supp. 9, 19-20 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd, Cheng
v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1983); Matsuoka, supranote 106, at 40.
130.
51 MINSHU 4055 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 11, 1997), aff'g LEXIDB No. 28011317
(Tokyo High Ct., May 31, 1993), affg LEXIDB No. 28033533 (Chiba Dist. Ct., Mar. 23,
1992), an excerpt translated in 41 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 117 (1998).

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 4056.
Id.
Id. at 4056-57.
Id. at 4057.
Id.
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defendant and consequently proposed to settle accounts by a letter of
credit (L/C), rather than by cash, and requested that the defendant
return the outstanding amounts of the entrusted funds. 136 The
defendant rejected the plaintiffs request to return the funds, and the
plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant in the Chiba District
Court in Japan. 137 Both the district court and the Tokyo High Court
ruled that Japanese courts had no jurisdiction over the case. 138 The
139
plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court also denied jurisdiction. 140 In this case, the
applicability of the provision for venue at "the place of performance of
the obligation"'141 was at issues. As discussed, 142 scholars asserted
that the applicability of this provision should be restrictively
interpreted in international litigation. The Supreme Court did not
denied jurisdiction for the reason of
opine on this issue but instead
"exceptional circumstances."'1 43
The Supreme Court considered the following factors in its
determination of "exceptional circumstances": (1) the defendant could
not expect litigation in Japan based on the purpose and substance of
the contract (the expectation of the defendant); (2) the defendant had
located its principal place of business for more than twenty years in
Germany (the nature of the defendant); (3) pieces of evidence
concerning the defense of the defendant (not the assertions of the
plaintiff) were concentrated in Germany (the convenience of the
defendant); and (4) the burden placed on the plaintiff in pursuing
litigation in Germany was not too large, because the plaintiff was a
of automobiles from
corporation that engaged in the importing
14 4
Germany (the burden placed on the plaintiff).
These four factors are similar to some of the factors considered in
the U.S. doctrine of forum non conveniens, especially those related to
private interests of the litigants, 145 and factors considered by U.S.

Id.
136.
Id.
137.
138.
Family K.K. v. Miyahara, LEX/DB No. 28011317 (Tokyo High Ct., May 31,
1993); Family K.K. v. Miyahara, LEX/DB No. 28033533 (Chiba Dist. Ct., Mar. 23,
1992).
139.

Family K.K, 51 MINSHU at 4056.

140.
141.
142.

Id. at 4059.
CCP art. 5(i); Family K.K., 51 MINSHU at 4058.
See supraPart II.C.2.

143.
144.

Family K.K., 51 MINSHU at 4058-59.
Id.

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (citing Gulf Oil Corp.
145.
v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-509 (1947)), pointed out two factors to be considered in
forum non conveniens determinations: private interests of the litigants and public
factors. Private interests of the litigants include the:
[R]elative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process
for attendance of unwilling [witnesses], and the cost of obtaining attendance of
willing . . . witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be
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courts concerning the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction that
were formulated in accordance with the "traditional notion of fair
play and substantial justice"'14 6 (hereinafter, "reasonableness
analysis"). Some Japanese commentators pointed out that factors
considered in the "exceptional circumstances" approach in Japanese
courts were similar to those considered in the U.S. doctrine of forum
non conveniens.147 It is interesting that in the annotation 148 to this
case, the Judicial Research Official of the Supreme Court
(Saik6saibanshoChdsakan) in charge of this case cited the provision
concerning forum non conveniens in the preliminary draft of the
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters in explaining the factors to be considered in
149
determining whether "exceptional circumstances" exist.
This decision is also problematic.
The court in Family
considered the location of evidence in relation to the convenience of
the defendant only. 150 That decision did not mention the convenience

appropriate [for] the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of
a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.
Id. at 241 n.6. Public factors include:
[T]he administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the local
interest in having localized controversies decided at home; the interest in
having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law that
must govern the action; the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of
laws . . . or in the application of foreign law; and the unfairness of burdening
citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.
Id.
146.
The U.S. bifurcated framework of "minimum contacts" and "reasonableness
analysis" for jurisdictional decisions is exemplified in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). In its reasonableness analysis, the court
considered the following factors: the burden on the defendant; the interests of the
forum state; the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief; the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared
interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Id.
at 113 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)). A
Japanese scholar observes that the U.S. bifurcated test discussed above is similar to
the two-step test in Japanese jurisdictional decision-making-i.e., (1) a decision
concerning each venue provision under Japan's CCP and (2) a decision concerning
"exceptional circumstances."
Yoshiaki Nomura, Nichibei Saibankankatsu HOri no
Hikaku Wakugumi [Theoretical Framework for Comparison--Japaneseand American
Doctrines on Jurisdiction], 52 HANDAI H6GAKU 647, 662 (2002).
147.
See, e.g., D6gauchi, supra note 70, at 107.
148.
Takahashi, supra note 10, at 1336-37, 1345 n.41. The annually published
'Annotation on Supreme Court Decisions," which is authored by Judicial Research
Officials of the Supreme Court, is a quasi primary source for Japanese jurists. For
further explanations on the task of Judicial Research Officials of the Supreme Court in
Japan, see CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN, supra note 6, § 8.03[5] [c].
149.
Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 22(1)-(2) (Oct. 30, 1999), available at
http://www.hcch.net/doc/jdgmdfte.pdf.
150.
Family K.K. v. Miyahara, 51 MINSHC 4055, 4059 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 11, 1997).
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of the court or the plaintiffs relating to the location of pieces of
evidence. 15 1 If one presumes the legitimacy of considering the
convenience of obtaining evidence as one factor influencing
jurisdictional decisions, then there is no plausible reason to ignore
the convenience of courts or plaintiffs. In addition, in relation to such
a narrow interpretation, the Court did not mention the possibility of
inconvenience caused by reasons other than the location of
evidence-such as the possibility of inconvenience to the parties or a
German court caused by the need to interpret the testimony in
Japanese or to translate Japanese documentary evidence. Because
the decision did not mention facts relating to this point, it is unclear
whether the court thought that interpretation or translation would
have increased the inconvenience in a German trial. It is likely that,
if the plaintiff had requested adjudication in Germany, the parties
would have had to interpret or translate the language used in the
examination of witnesses or documentary evidence because all
relevant parties were Japanese. Indeed, the lower courts that ruled
on this case found that the agreement of this transaction was written
in Japanese, although this fact did not convince the lower courts to
exercise their jurisdiction. 15 2 The Supreme Court should at least
have addressed this language barrier and balanced it with other
factors in denying jurisdiction of the Japanese court because the
location of evidence is not the only possible cause of inconvenience in
the examination of evidence.
More important, the Supreme Court in Family decided the case
independently from venue provisions and made a determination
through a "black box" of "exceptional circumstances." By doing this,
the conclusion of the case became very unpredictable because the
outcome of the evaluation of factors specified in this case could have
resulted in either conclusion.' 53 The problems associated with the
unpredictability of the outcomes of future cases resulting from the
Family decision are further discussed in the next section.

151.
Id.
152.
Family K.K. v. Miyahara, LEXIDB No. 28033533 (Chiba Dist. Ct., Mar. 23,
1992), aff'd, LEX/DB No. 28011317 (Tokyo High Ct., May 31, 1993).
153.
When I asked participants of a seminar (referred in supra note **) from
various countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Nigeria, Switzerland, and the United
States) to predict the outcome of Family after providing a general explanation of the
"exceptional circumstances" approach and the facts in Family, their opinions were
evenly divided: three (jurisdiction granted) to four (jurisdiction denied).
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IV. REFLECTIONS ON TENDENCIES IN RECENT JAPANESE COURT
DECISIONS

A. Shortfalls of Recent Tendencies and Proposalsfor Improvement
1. Unpredictability
In Malaysian Airline, the Supreme Court of Japan employed the
formalistic approach of the CCP venue provisions, providing
predictability and ease of administering jurisdictional rules.
Japanese courts have shifted from this formalistic approach to a U.S.style ad hoc approach-an approach that might achieve greater
fairness in litigation. This recent Japanese approach, however, has
several shortfalls.
First, an emphasis on fairness in litigation similar to that seen
in the U.S. model would too greatly increase the cost of administering
"exceptional
the
Although
processes.
resolution
dispute
circumstances" approach might result in greater litigational fairness,
it also increases the unpredictability of jurisdictional decisions. The
ruling in Family could have been determined either way by balancing
the four factors. This judicial tendency toward an emphasis on
fairness in litigation will give defendants frivolous pretexts to
challenge jurisdiction and will increase the social costs of resolving
pre-trial disputes. This is the criticism made by U.S. scholars
regarding U.S. practices, 154 and this same criticism will also hold for
future Japanese practice. Further, unless an appropriate forum for a
case is clearly defined by certain rules in advance, it is difficult for
parties to a transnational dispute to achieve a settlement before a
lawsuit or at an early stage of litigation because choice-of-law rules
might differ depending on forum and the law governing the case may
differ accordingly. 155 The expense of introducing the U.S. approach in
Japan is far too high.
The unpredictability of the outcome of cases in Japan might be
even greater than in U.S. courts under ad hoc, standard-based
approach. In Family, the Japanese Supreme Court considered four
factors in making its jurisdictional decision. 156 In determining

E.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal
154.
Jurisdiction:From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19,
102 (1990) ("[w]orse than the strange results, however, is the lack of predictability and
the resources consumed litigating the most elementary of questions.").
See Masato D6gauchi, Kokusai Saiban Kankatsu [International
155.
Jurisdiction], in SHIN - SAIBAN JITSUMU TAIKEI III [NEW - SYSTEM OF PRACTICE OF
LITIGATION III] 40, 47 (Akira Takakuwa & Masato D6gauchi eds., 2002). •
See supra Part III.D.
156.
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jurisdictional issues, the Court did not prioritize these four factors,
one of which is the "expectation of the defendant." The "expectation
of the defendant" was just one factor weighed together with the
others, and this factor was not considered a "necessary condition" to
find jurisdiction over the case. On the other hand, in the United
States, the existence of the "purposeful availment" concerning
minimum contacts analysis is a "necessary condition" for
jurisdiction. 1 57 Further, in Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior
Court, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that "[w]hen minimum contacts
have been established, often the interests of the plaintiff and the
forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious
burdens placed on the alien defendant." 158 Thus, the Court suggested
that if minimum contacts are established, then jurisdiction is denied
in accordance with the "traditional notion of fair play and substantial
justice" (reasonableness analysis) only in truly exceptional cases. 159
Therefore, the U.S. jurisdictional determination by a reasonableness
analysis, at least as clarified by the Supreme Court in Asahi is not a
"black box" as is the "exceptional circumstances" approach in the
recent Japanese judgments.
To improve the predictability of cases, Japanese courts should
generally not disregard the CCP venue provisions and should instead
faithfully apply those provisions to international cases. As seen in
Muk~da and Family, recent courts have put little emphasis on
interpreting the venue provisions of the CCP. 160 They rely heavily on
"exceptional circumstances" analysis to determine jurisdictional
matters. 161 Generally speaking, however, each venue provision was
codified to accommodate various considerations that are important in
the determination of jurisdictional matters. The cleverness of this
rule-based approach is that judges do not have to balance interests in
every case presented before them. This is true even for international
cases. The framers intended international cases to be resolved in
accordance with these provisions. 16 2
The recent approach in
Japanese cases compromises predictability and spoils the cleverness
of the rule-based approach. If any of the venue grounds provided for
in the CCP exists in Japan, jurisdiction should be denied only in
extreme cases by a consideration of "exceptional circumstances."
Unreasonable results that could arise from flaws in some of the CCP

157.
See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (requiring some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum state).
158.
480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987).
159.
Id.
160.
Family K.K. v. Miyahara, 51 MINSHO 4055 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 11, 1997);
Muk6da v. Boeing Co., 1196 HANREI JIH6 87, 604 HANREI TAIMUZU 138 (Tokyo Dist.
Ct., June 20, 1986).
161.
Id.
162.
See supra note 10.
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venue provisions discussed above should be avoided by employing the
"exceptional circumstances" approach to consider particular
unreasonableness, if any, in each specific case-not by disregarding
the CCP venue provisions entirely.
Further, in determining whether "exceptional circumstances"
exist, interests or considerations that were already taken into account
at the time of codifying the CCP venue provisions should not be
considered again in each new case. Courts are supposed to follow
conclusions reached by mechanical application of venue provisions in
most cases. For example, ordinary inconvenience of plaintiffs to file a
case at the place of a defendant should not be considered in the
determination of "exceptional circumstances," because such general
inconvenience of a plaintiff is common in all cases and such a common
question of inconvenience was already considered when the CCP
adopted the actor sequitur forum rei principle. Only "exceptional"
circumstances that are particular to the specific case before the court
and that were not considered by the CCP's framers in codifying its
considered in the determination of
venue provisions should be 163
"exceptional circumstances."
If the term "exceptional
strict manner, it will improve
a
such
in
interpreted
is
circumstances"
predictability because it will not be used as a "black box" to decide
jurisdiction.
A fair and reasonable outcome of the case might be achieved by
modifying CCP provisions or by balancing interests in interpreting
the meaning of each provision, as seen in Yabutani,16 4 rather than by
But such
employing the "exceptional circumstances" approach.
modification is inappropriate in Japan. The problems should be
resolved with prompt legislation to enact more complete jurisdictional
provisions. The ad hoc restriction or changing of.meaning through
"interpretation" of each venue provision by courts would bring about
instability in the jurisdictional system as a whole because there is no
stare decisis rule in Japan. Although court decisions, especially those
of Japan's Supreme Court, have de facto binding effects on future
16 5
cases, they have no legally binding effects for lower court decisions.

See D6gauchi, supra note 85, at 43-44. For example, suppose the plaintiff
163.
in a Japanese court is a Japanese victim of damage resulting from use of HIVcontaminated blood components manufactured by a U.S. corporation; his condition is
very bad and his death is imminent. In such a case, the facts that (a) the plaintiffs
illness renders him unable to travel to the U.S. to testify before a U.S. court and (b) the
need of a prompt remedy for the plaintiff exists because of his imminent death may be
considered in the determination of "exceptional circumstances" because these facts are
particular to this specific case and were not considered by the legislator at the time of
the enactment of the CCP.
Yabutani v. Boeing Co., 754 HANREI JIHO 58, 312 HANREI TAIMUZU 241
164.
(Tokyo Dist. Ct. Interlocutory J., July 24, 1974); see Part III.A.
165.

See SHIGEMITSU DANDO, HOGAKU No Kiso [BASIS FOR LEGAL STUDY] 166

(1996) (on file with author).
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Consequently, for example, when intermediate appellate courts are
split in the interpretation of the provision providing for venue at the
defendant's "principal place of business in Japan," district courts need
not follow the interpretation of the immediate upper appellate courts.
Therefore, such ad hoc modifications of CCP provisions by each court
will make it impossible for litigants to predict, before judgment,
which rule will govern the case.
2. The Unreasonableness of Importing the Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens
The second problem of the Japanese jurisdictional system is the
frequent injection of considerations similar to those of the U.S.
doctrine of forum non conveniens into jurisdictional decisions despite
the fact that the structure of U.S. jurisdictional decisions is
fundamentally different from those of Japan.
In the United States, forum non conveniens operates at the
discretion of the court after the court finds jurisdiction. 16 6 Therefore,
the denial of forum under this doctrine does not mean that the U.S.
court has denied jurisdiction over the defendant. The court may
consequently exercise certain controls over the defendant even after it
denies a forum for the case under this doctrine.
Japanese courts have frequently denied jurisdiction under
considerations similar to forum non conveniens.16 7 In contrast to the
U.S. model, Japanese courts appear to imply that, in international
litigation, multiple fora may not have jurisdiction over a single case.
Even if this observation that Japanese courts do not allow multiple
fora to have concurrent jurisdiction over a single case is not true,
Japanese courts at least appear to presume that in very limited
instances multiple countries may concurrently exercise jurisdiction
over a single case. The idea of forum non conveniens in the United
States, however, stands on the premise that multiple fora may have
jurisdiction over one case as a matter of course. 16 8 Even in Japan, in
the context of domestic litigation, it is understood that multiple fora
may have jurisdiction over a single case and, if the forum chosen by
the plaintiff is inconvenient, an adjustment is made by transferring

166.
Forum non conveniens permits a court to "decline to exercise its
jurisdiction, even though the court has jurisdiction and venue, when it appears that the
convenience of the parties and the court and the interests of justice indicate that the
action should be tried in another forum." Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981
F.2d 824, 828 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 250
(1981)).

167.
See Ronald A. Brand, Comparative Forum Non Conveniens and the Hague
Convention on Jurisdictionand Judgments, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 467, 487 (2002).
168.
See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947) (stating "[in]
all cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into play, it presupposes
at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process").
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the case to a more convenient court. 169 Japanese courts, however,
appear to presuppose that in international litigation multiple courts
may not have jurisdiction concurrently, or that if they may have it,
then they may only have it in extreme cases. 170 Such a supposition
might lead courts unreasonably to bar Japanese plaintiffs from
Such an
efficiently obtaining remedies in their own forum.
171
unreasonable conclusion was dramatically illustrated in Mukdda.
In Muk6da, the Japanese plaintiffs were precluded from obtaining
efficient remedy in a Japanese court for the reason of inconvenience
of the forum, although any inconvenience that did exist was not so
172
serious, as was argued above.
Of course, there are positive aspects of the rigid Japanese
approach. If the court supposes only one forum for each international
case, litigants are precluded from "forum shopping." The litigant
should choose one "correct" forum in advance. If the "correct" forum
is outside of Japan, the litigant should first obtain a foreign judgment
and then consider taking a step toward recognition and enforcement
In recognition and enforcement
of the judgment in Japan.
proceedings, Japanese courts can grant jurisdiction of the foreign
court and recognize and enforce the foreign judgment in Japan only
73
when the litigant has chosen the one "correct" forum.'
Such an inflexible treatment is theoretically plausible but
practically impossible. As is explained above, 174 it is very difficult to

A court may transfer the case to another court in order to avoid
169.
considerable delay of the suit or for the sake of fairness to the parties, in consideration
of (a) the parties' residence and the witnesses who might be examined; (b) the location
of the objects that might be inspected; or (c) any other circumstance. CCP art. 17. This
provision permits a court to transfer the case to a court at another venue in
consideration of factors relating to the effectiveness of adjudication. This provision is
applied to domestic cases only. There is no explicit provision in Japan's CCP that
permits a court to deny hearing the case when there is a more convenient foreign forum
for an international case.
See, e.g., Family K.K. v. Miyahara, 51 MINSH0 4055 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 11,
170.
1997); Muk6da v. Boeing Co., 1196 HANREI JIH6 87, 604 HANREI TAIMUzU 138 (Tokyo
Dist. Ct., June 20, 1986).
171.
Mukoda, 1196 HANREI JIH6 at 87, 604 HANREI TAIMUZU at 138; see also
supra Part III.C.2.
Mukdda, 1196 HANREI JIHO at 87, 604 HANREI TAIMUZU at 138.
172.
173.
To recognize and enforce foreign judgments in Japan, the Japanese court
must have indirect jurisdiction. See supra note 83 for the definition of the indirect
jurisdiction. The requirements to grant indirect jurisdiction had been considered to be
the same as those for direct jurisdiction (mirror image theory; Spiegelbildtheorie).
Hiroshige Takata, Article 200, in 4 CHOSHAKU MINJI SOSHO-H6 354, 370 (Masahiro
Suzuki & Yoshimitsu Aoyama eds., 1997). But in a recent case the Japanese Supreme
Court held that these rules are not necessarily the same, although they substantially
overlap. Kishinchand Naraindas Sadhwani v. Gobindram Naraindas Sadhwani, 52
MINSHU 853, 860 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 28, 1998). See Yoshinori Kawabe, Annotated Case No.
19, in 1 HEISEI 10 NENDO SAIKO SAIBANSHO HANREI KAISETSU [ANNOTATION ON
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS OF THE 1998 TERM] 450, 473-75 (2001).
See supra Part IV.A. 1.
174.
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predict the outcome of jurisdictional decisions in advance under the
current Japanese jurisdictional system. Litigants who mistakenly
did not choose the "correct" forum have to file another lawsuit in the
hope of selecting the right forum the second time. In addition, there
is no guarantee a foreign forum that the Japanese system deems to be
"correct" will adjudicate the case because the jurisdictional system of
Japan differs from those of foreign countries.
Forum shopping can be phased out by the gradual harmonization
of jurisdictional systems and choice-of-law rules.
Because the
harmonization of these two matters has not been accomplished yet,
we have no choice in Japan but to have a "loose" jurisdictional
system-i.e., a system in which the litigant may have multiple fora in
most cases. A litigant's unreasonable preclusion from a convenient
forum would be more detrimental than the risk of forum shopping.
Commentators have pointed out that the adjustment of multiple
fora in jurisdictional decisions is inevitable in international cases
because no transfer system exists for cases in which the current
forum is inconvenient. 175 Decisions of the Japanese Supreme Court
presupposed such necessity for adjustment. 176 A certain adjustment
is necessary if the degree of inconvenience at the current forum is
extreme. But the current Japanese practice has gone far beyond that.
The factor of "convenience" does not require a single forum in every
international case. For example, the Court in Family precluded the
Japanese plaintiff from obtaining a remedy at the Japanese court,
ruling that the adjudication of the case in Japan would be too
inconvenient. 1 77 But the inconvenience of adjudication at a Japanese
court would not have been serious enough in Family to justify the
rejection of jurisdiction by simply pointing to the term "exceptional
circumstances"-a term unarticulated in the CCP. 178 The Court also
should have considered the high costs associated with the uncertainty
that would result with respect to jurisdictional decisions in future
cases. If any of the CCP venue grounds existed in both Japan and
Germany, other than in very exceptional cases, both countries should
have jurisdiction.
One might argue that the U.S. decisions concerning the
reasonableness of jurisdiction under the concept of the "traditional
notion of fair play and substantial justice" (reasonableness analysis)
179
are similar to decisions concerning forum non conveniens as well,

175.
176.
177.
178.

E.g., D5gauchi, supra note 70, at 102; see supra note 169.
Takahashi, supra note 10, at 1335.
Family K.K. v. Miyahara, 51 MINSHO 4055, 4059 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 11, 1997).
See supra Part III.D.

179.

See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4.8,

at 173 (4th ed. 2001) ("[T]he portion of the [Asahi] opinion joined in by eight of the
Justices raises to the level of due process concepts usually associated with the
discretionary dismissal doctrine of forum non conveniens.").
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and that the frameworks of jurisdictional decisions in the United
States and Japan are not very different in that both frameworks
consider factors similar to forum non conveniens. But introduction of
factors similar to forum non conveniens into jurisdictional decisions
has introduced fewer problems in the United States than in Japan,
because the U.S. Supreme Court dictates that the reasonableness
analysis can only be used to counter the effect of the existence of
minimum contacts in exceptional cases, as is explained above.18 0
3. The Different Roles of Judges in Civil and Common Law Countries
The third problem of the flexible Japanese approach is that it is
not consistent with the traditional role of judges in civil law
cournties, in that the Japanese approach has given much discretion
to judges to determine jurisdictional issues.
Japanese courts
traditionally have not been expected to create law to the same extent
as courts are expected to do in common law countries. This is
especially true in an area of procedural law in which consistent
application of statutory provisions and predictability of results are
highly desired.
It is true that Japanese judges occasionally establish new law.
This can occur when the proper interpretation of a statutory provision
is unclear or gaps exist between statutory provisions and the reality
of society. It is also true that Japan's Supreme Court develops law,
especially in the area of substantive law. For example, the Supreme
Court created a new type of security interest that relevant statutes
did not yet recognize.'81 Further, several influential scholars have
pointed out that the role of judges in civil law countries, including
Japan, has become more active in creating law than in the past and
has gradually become similar to the role of judges in common law
18 2
countries.

180.
See supra Part IV.A.1.
181.
This new type of security interest is called kari tdki tanpo [provisional
registration security] and was codified in the Kari T5ki Tanpo Keiyaku ni Kansuru
H6ritsu [Law Regarding Provisional Registration Security Contract], Law No. 78 of
1978, following the Supreme Court decision of Mikami v. Kobayashi, 28 MINSH0 1473
(Sup. Ct., Oct. 23, 1974) (holding that the registration of the real estate to the effect
that ownership of the real estate would pass to the lender if the borrower defaulted is
not a registration of a real "transfer" but only that of "security" of the real estate, and
therefore in such case the difference between the value of the real estate and the
borrower's debt must be returned to the borrower). See TAKASHI UCHIDA, MINP6 III
[CIVIL LAW III] 539 (2d ed. 2004) (court decisions virtually created this new type of
security interest).
182.
See, e.g., Nobuyoshi Ashibe, Shiho ni Okeru Kenryoku-sei [The Nature of
Power in the Judiciary], in 6 IWANAMI KOZA KIHON HOGAKU: KENRYOKU [IWANAMI
LECTURERS ON BASIC LEGAL STUDIES: POWERS] 219, 224-28 (Nobuyoshi Ashibe et al.

eds., 1983) (on file with author).
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Still, Japanese practitioners consider that such creative
phenomena of judicial activities are exceptional-especially in the
area of procedural law-and that the role of judges in Japan is still
passive and fundamentally different from that in common law
countries. In the area of procedural law, the majority of Japanese
practitioners, and even judges themselves, appear to expect Japanese
judges to apply faithfully law enacted by legislators rather than
create law themselves. Legal scholars have occasionally proposed
departing from mechanical application of traditional legal principles
and introducing ad hoc determinations. For example, scholars have
proposed expansion of standing (tjisha tekikaku)183 and the scope of
the issue preclusion (s6ten-kW) 184 even though the CCP did not
explicitly provide such proposed expansions. Courts have rejected
such flexible treatments in the absence of explicit provisions in the
CCP regarding these matters. 18 5 It appears that courts are concerned
that ad hoc determination of procedural matters would introduce
instability into proceedings. Dynamic evolution of law is simply not
as prevalent in Japan as it is in common law countries.
Determination of jurisdiction occasionally requires making
difficult policy determinations, and therefore legislators, not judges,
should first address such policy determinations-and judges should
respect those legislators' determinations. For example, in crossborder product liability cases, courts often have to make difficult
choices between two competing interests-protecting consumers and
protecting international trade and business interests. Jurisdictional
rules of the European Union include many provisions intended to
avoid complications that courts might otherwise face when making
highly difficult policy determinations in the areas of consumer and

183.

MAKOTO ITo, MINJI SOSH6 NO ThJIsHA [PARTIES OF CIVIL LITIGATION] 112

(1978) (on file with author).
184.
K6ji Shind5, Jdkentsuki Kyafu Hanketsu to Sono Kdka [Conditional
Coercive Judgment and its Effects], 10 MINJI SOSHO ZASSHI 1 (1963), reprinted in KOJI
SHINDO, SOSH6BUTSU TO SOTEN KO - JO [SUBJECT MATTERS AND ISSUE PRECLUSION

EFFECTS I] 183 (1988); K5ji ShindS, Kihanryoku to Sosh~butsu [Res Judicata and
Subject Matters], 80-3 HOGAKU KYOKAI ZASSHI 295 (1963), reprinted in KOJI SHIND(),
SOSHOBUTSU TO S6TEN-KO - JO [SUBJECT MATTERS AND ISSUE PRECLUSION EFFECTS I]

145 (1988).
See It6 v. KyfishOi Denryoku K.K., 1181 HANREI JIH6 77, 586 HANREI
185.
TAIMUzU 64 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 20, 1985) (rejecting adoption of the view proposed by
Professor It5 regarding the expansion of standing and denying standing of the
plaintiffs); Watano v. Kanetani, 1014 HANREI JIHO 69, 450 HANREI TAIMUzu 88 (Sup.
Ct., July 3, 1981); Kaneko v. Takahashi, 724 HANREI JIHO 33 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 4, 1973);
Matsumoto v. Tamadan, 569 HANREI JIHO 48, 239 HANREI TAiMuzu 143 (Sup. Ct.,

June 24, 1969) (rejecting adoption of a view proposed by Professor Shind5 regarding
expansion of the scope of issue preclusion and denying issue preclusion as to the
reasoning in the preceding judgment).
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laborer protection. 186 This exemplifies the fact that European Union
countries, most of which are civil law countries, recognize that judges
might not be able to decide properly jurisdictional matters that
involve policy determinations without guidance from detailed
provisions.
In Japan, such detailed provisions as those of the
European Union do not exist. This does not mean, however, that
Japanese judges may disregard the current provisions in the CCP.
Courts must first pay close attention to the literal meaning of the
provisions of statutes. If a court finds that the meaning of any
provision is not clear or does not clearly apply to the matter at hand,
then the court should look into the legislators' intentions. 8 7 The
Court in Family, however, improperly encouraged lower courts to
ignore legislative policy decisions as codified in the CCP by
circumventing application of relevant venue provisions. 188
This does not mean that judges may not create law in civil law
countries. The explanation above intends to point out objective
phenomena in Japan, which is a civil law country. Judges in civil law
countries should be allowed to create law when appropriate. But
recent Japanese decisions regarding jurisdictional issues have gone
astray by disregarding the legislators' clear mandates in the CCP. 189
As discussed above, from this perspective, courts should rely on
the "exceptional circumstances" sparingly. 190
B. The Potentialof the JapaneseJurisdictionalFramework
As shown above, the Japanese framework for deciding
international jurisdiction combines the Continental European rulebased approach and the U.S. standard-based approach.
The
Japanese approach is similar to the Continental European approach
in that courts are supposed to apply rules codified in a statute when
determining jurisdictional issues. It is also similar to the U.S.
approach in that courts may exercise discretion in evaluating
relevant factors in the determination of "exceptional circumstances."
Notwithstanding the problems with the current Japanese approach
explained above, if the doctrine of "exceptional circumstances" is
strictly applied only in extreme cases, this framework may well
accommodate two opposing demands-preserving predictability and
achieving fairness in litigation in each case.
This Japanese

186.
For example, arts. 8-13 (insurance contracts), arts. 15-17 (consumer
contracts) and arts. 18-21 (employment contracts) of Council Regulation 44/2001, 2001
O.J. (L 12) 1, 5-7.

187.
See Fujita, "Kokusai Saiban Kankatsu Hdki" to Sono Hikakuhd teki
Kenkya, supra note 10, at 11.
188.
Family K.K. v. Miyahara, 51 MINSHU 4055 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 11, 1997).
189.
Id.
190.
See supra Part IV.A. 1.
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framework might preserve predictability by mechanical application of
venue provisions. If the conclusion is too harsh for the litigants or
inconvenient for the court, courts may decline jurisdiction under the
doctrine of "exceptional circumstances," just as U.S. jurisdictional
decisions do pursuant to reasonableness analysis. In Continental
European countries, as typified in the German regime, courts are not
given discretion in jurisdictional decisions. By limiting the scope of
application of the "exceptional circumstances" doctrine, it might be
easier for such countries to accept this scheme than to accept a purely
ad hoc, standard-basedapproach like that of the United States.
Thus, this Japanese jurisdictional framework explained above
has the potential to accommodate the conflicting considerations from
two distinct legal regimes: Continental Europe and the United States.

V.

CONCLUSION

In the process of assessing the reasonableness of rules or
standards used in decisions of jurisdictional issues, perspectives of
comparative law are important. These perspectives are important
because they provide us with the means to evaluate whether the
exercise of jurisdiction is exorbitant or too restrictive. Professor
Weintraub, in relation to the evaluation of the Asahi decision, noted
that "[c]oncern to avoid offending friendly foreign nations is
commendable, but is relevant only if a United States court is
exercising jurisdiction that is 'exorbitant' under international
standards."191 Thus, one important way to evaluate whether a court's
exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable is to assess the likely
conclusion of the case from the perspective of international standards.
These means have not been widely used.
The restrictive interpretation of the CCP provisions and the
developments of the "exceptional circumstances" approach in Japan
stemmed from scholars' recognition that some venue provisions in the
CCP were too excessive and unreasonable to be applied in
international cases. 192 But viewed in light of U.S. treatment, one
might consider that such recognition is groundless and that the
outcome in Malaysian Airline was not necessarily unreasonable. U.S.
courts would find jurisdiction over defendants in similar cases based
on the fact that the defendants had continuous and systematic
contacts with the forum state through the activity of a local office,
even when such offices were not related to the disputes. 193 Although

WEINTRAUB, supra note 179, at 174.
191.
See supra Part III.C.1.
192.
See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952);
193.
LOWENFELD, supra note 61, at 49; Linda J. Silberman, Judicial Jurisdiction in the
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there would be no jurisdiction over the defendant in such a case
under the jurisdictional regime of the European Union, 194 the
exercise of jurisdiction seems to be generally fair and reasonable if a
defendant has assumed the risk of litigation in the foreign country by
establishing a stable base for business in that country unless other
concerns such as inconvenience of adjudication would hamper the
reasonableness of adjudication there. 19 5 The reasonableness of
exerting jurisdiction should be evaluated from a comparative law
perspective. 196
Introducing a comparative law perspective is also useful for
global harmonization of jurisdictional systems. So far, the differences
between civil and common law countries have been emphasized in the
discussion of this topic. As this Article has shown, however, the
regime of a civil law country, Japan, has some commonalities with
the U.S. jurisdictional system.
A comparative law perspective
suggests the possibility of harmonization between two distinct legal
regimes, although this is not an easily achievable task.
Thus, the unique status of the Japanese jurisdictional system as
a convergence of a rule-based approach and a standard-based
approach might provide a new perspective for a discussion of global
harmonization of jurisdictional systems.

Conflict of Laws Course: Adding a Comparative Dimension, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
389, 404 (1995).

194.

See Council

Regulation 44/2001,

art. 5(5),

2001

O.J. (L 12)

1, 4;

LOWENFELD, supra note 61, at 50.

195.
But see supra note 24.
196.
See Silberman, supra note 193, at 402 (emphasizing a comparative law
perspective in the discussion of conflict of laws and judicial jurisdiction).

